Schooling, nation building and industrialization: a Gellnerian approach by Hauk, Esther & Ortega, Javier
ISSN 2042-2695 
CEP Discussion Paper No 1328 
February 2015 
Schooling, Nation Building and Industrialization: 
A Gellnerian Approach 
Esther Hauk and Javier Ortega 
Abstract 
We model a two-region country where value is created through bilateral production between masses 
and elites (bourgeois and landowners). Industrialization requires the elites to finance schools and the 
masses to attend them. Schooling raises productivity, particularly for matches between masses and 
bourgeois. At the same time, only country-wide education ("unified schooling") renders the masses 
mobile across regions. Alternatively, schools can be implemented in one region alone ("regional 
education") or the regionally dominant group can choose to implement schooling in its own region but 
refuse to share the costs/proceeds within the wider country-level group (.secession.). We show that 
schools are more likely to be set-up when the bourgeoisie dominates, but that this is not necessarily 
socially efficient. Unified schooling is always chosen if the identity of the dominant elite at the 
regional and country level is the same and/or the industrialization shock is sufficiently high. If instead 
the bourgeoisie is dominant in one region and landowners are dominant countrywise, the bourgeoisie 
of that region may promote the secession of the region, and this can be socially efficient. The model is 
shown to be consistent with evidence for 19th century France and Spain. 
Key words: Nation-building, education, industrialization 
JEL codes: D02; I2; N00; O14 
This paper was produced as part of the Centre’s Labour Market Programme. The Centre for Economic 
Performance is financed by the Economic and Social Research Council. 
We thank Ramon Caminal, Paolo Masella, Yona Rubinstein and seminar participants at the CEP 
(LSE), Royal Economic Society, ESSLE-CEPR, City University London, and Workshop on Culture 
and Institutions (Valencia) for useful comments and suggestions. Hauk thanks the LSE for its 
hospitality and acknowledges financial support from the Spanish Ministry of Economy and 
Competitiveness, through the Severo Ochoa Programme for Centres of Excellence in R&D (SEV-
2011-0075) and through CICYT project number ECO2012-37065 and from the government of 
Catalonia. 
Esther Hauk, Institut d.Anàlisi Econòmica (IAE-CSIC) and Barcelona Graduate School of 
Economics. Javier Ortega, City University London and Centre for Economic Performance, London 
School of Economics. 
Published by 
Centre for Economic Performance 
London School of Economics and Political Science 
Houghton Street 
London WC2A 2AE 
All rights reserved.  No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or 
transmitted in any form or by any means without the prior permission in writing of the publisher nor 
be issued to the public or circulated in any form other than that in which it is published. 
Requests for permission to reproduce any article or part of the Working Paper should be sent to the 
editor at the above address. 
 E. Hauk and J. Ortega, submitted 2014. 
1 Introduction
Political scientists, historians, sociologists and anthropologists have exten-
sively discussed the issue of the historical genesis of nations and nationalism
(see e.g. Smith, 2000, for a summary of the debate). While “perennialists”
argue that national identities have existed for a long period of time (see
e.g. Armstrong, 1982, or Hastings, 1997), “modernists” situate the birth of
nations and nationalism during industrialization.
In particular, Gellner (1964, 1983) has been very influential in arguing
that both Nations and Nationalism result from the implementation of mass
educational systems to get workers ready for industrialization. As stated by
Breuilly (2006, p. xxxiv), “Gellner insisted that industrialization required
or entailed cultural homogenization based on literacy in a standardized ver-
nacular language conveyed by means of state supported mass education”.
According to Gellner, industrialization requires a diﬀuse, universal culture,
linking the inhabitants of a territory to the state. Because workers through
schooling acquire a common national identity that enables them to com-
municate with each other, they also become mobile. In addition, as mass
education is expensive, Gellner (1983) argues that the minimum size for a
viable modern political unit is determined by the ability to finance such an
educational system. More recently, Breuilly (1993) has criticized Gellner’s
theory and other theories of nationalism because they failed to stress that
nationalism is about power and state control, and has argued that “the cen-
tral task is to relate nationalism to the objectives of obtaining and using
state power” (Breuilly, 1993, p. 1). In addition, Roeder (2007) and Kro-
neberg and Wimmer (2012) argue that nation building should be understood
as resulting from the interaction between central and peripheral elites.1
We contribute to the literature by developing a theoretical model that
relates nation building, schooling and industrialization à la Gellner, and
aims at the same time at presenting nation-building as resulting from the
interaction of social groups holding power.
To this purpose, we model a two-region economy populated by masses
and by two elite groups (landowners and bourgeoisie, as in Galor, Moav and
Vollrath, 2009). Regions are heterogeneous in the size of their bourgeoisie.
Political power is in the hands of one of the elite groups, referred to as the
“dominant group”, which is not necessarily the same at the regional and at
the country level. Value is created through bilateral production between the
1The importance of the power interaction among groups in the genesis of institutions
has been extensively studied in the literature, see e.g. Acemoglu and Robinson (2001).
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members of the elites and the members of the masses. Initially, the country
is a rural society, and production takes place only within each region.
The economy is hit by a productivity shock representing an industrializa-
tion opportunity which can raise the productivity of the masses, and does so
to a larger extent in the matches with bourgeois than with landowners.2 In
order to be more productive, mass members need however to attend school.3
In addition, schooling is used to create a common identity.4 The set-up of
the schooling system can only be financed by the elites, but mass members
decide whether to attend school or not.
The politically dominant elite group decides if and how to implement
schooling and how the costs of schooling are shared within the elite. In
particular, the politically dominant country-level elite can choose to im-
plement schooling in one region only (“regional education”) in which case
only within-region production is possible. Alternatively, it can choose to
implement schools in both regions (“unified schooling”), which creates a
common national identity and makes it possible for the masses of one re-
gion to produce with the other region’s bourgeoisie. Finally, we consider the
possibility that the dominant region-level elite implements schooling in its
own region but refuses to share the associated costs and benefits within the
wider country-level group (“secession”).
Under all three systems, equilibrium education is shown to be weakly
higher when the bourgeoise dominates, which simply stems from the higher
payoﬀs of bourgeois relative to landowners.
However, we next show that the identity of the dominant group does not
matter instead in the choice of educational system whenever the dominant
2The same hypothesis is made in Galor et al. (2009). Empirically, Lindert (2004) refers
to examples of resistance of landlords to education in 19th century England and Germany,
and Ager (2013) shows that counties with richer planters before the Civil War invested
less in human capital and were less productive in the 20th century.
3There is a debate on whether industrialisation caused mass schooling or the other
way round. What matters for our model is that these phenomena go hand in hand.
Becker, Hornung and Woesmann (2011) reveal the importance of formal education for
the technological catch-up of Prussia. Galor and Moav (2006) give historical evidence for
the industrial base for education reforms in the 19th century and reveals the importance
of schooling for at least the second phase of the industrial revolution. At the same time,
Allen (2003) argues that the impact of literacy on growth was limited and Squicciarini and
Voigtlaender (2014) show that knowledge of the elites (and not literacy) predicts growth
in France between 1750 and 1850. For an alternative hypothesis for the implementation
of mass education systems based on military rivalry see Aghion, Jaravel, Persson, and
Rouzet (2013).
4For a formal model of schooling as an instrument for language uniformisation, see
Ortega and Tangerås (2008).
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group is the same at the country and regional level. Indeed, in that case,
unified schooling is always chosen given its assumed technological advan-
tage. Specifically, a dominant bourgeoisie prefers this system because it can
directly benefit from the increase in the pool of matches, while dominant
landowners also favor it because the bourgeois are willing to pay a larger
share of the cost under this system.
However, despite this technological advantage, unified schooling can still
be dominated by secession if the dominant elite is not the same regionally
and countrywide. In particular, if the bourgeoisie is regionally-dominant and
countrywide dominated, the size of the cake is larger for them under unified
schooling but at the same time landowners can impose a large share of the
costs on them. In that case, the bourgeoisie chooses secession for interme-
diate values of the shock: indeed, if the shock is small enough, no schooling
is implemented under secession, and, in the other extreme, if the shock is
large, the size-of-the-cake eﬀect under unified schooling always dominates.
As for welfare, unified schooling leads to underprovision of education
whenever the gains from setting up schools for the dominant group are small
relative to the gains for the masses, and particularly so when landowners are
dominant, as they benefit less from education than the bourgeois. Interest-
ingly, however, overeducation can also arise if the bourgeoisie is dominant,
as this group chooses in some cases to fully finance education even if this
makes the landowners worse-oﬀ. Across systems, while a social planner
always prefers unified schooling over secession whenever implementing ed-
ucation is socially optimal, secession can be socially optimal if landowners
choose not to implement schooling under the unified system.
We also discuss other forms of heterogeneity across regions and their
eﬀects on nation building and secession. Our results are robust to diﬀerences
in sizes across the landowners and masses. However, if productivity shocks
are unequally distributed across regions - a case that seems to be historically
relevant - secession becomes more likely. Transfers from the more advanced
region to the less advanced region are too costly to oﬀset the savings in
educational costs.
Finally, we show that our model can be used to interpret the divergent
evolution of France and Spain in the 19th century. Indeed, despite their
common features in terms of income levels and language heterogeneity at
the beginning of the 19th century, France was successful in its joint nation
building/industrialization process through the implementation of a big in-
vestment in education. Instead, both industrialization and nation-building
remained weak in Spain, and peripheral nationalisms developed in Catalonia
and the Basque Country. As predicted by our model, the divergent evolution
4
of these two countries could be related to the diﬀerent balance of power be-
tween landowners and bourgeois at the regional and country level: while in
France the bourgeoisie was dominant both in the industrializing regions and
at the country level, in Spain the Catalan bourgeoisie was unable to have a
lot of influence in Spanish politics due to the dominance of the landowning
elites at the country level.
This paper relates to a growing literature that uses modelling and econo-
metric techniques to study the origin of nations or nation-states. Specifically,
Aspachs-Bracons et al. (2008) and Clots-Figueras and Masella (2013) un-
derline the importance of education for nation-building. Alternative mech-
anisms proposed in the literature as driving forces for nation-building in-
clude the consolidation of a previously existing “segment-state” (Roeder,
2007), political centralization prior to modernization (Kroneberg and Wim-
mer, 2012), or the homogenization of preferences on public goods (Alesina
and Reich, 2013). Empirically, Wimmer and Feinstein (2010) argues that
the origin of nation-states lie on local and regional factors.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we de-
velop the basic model and describe when regional and unified schooling are
implementable. In turn, these two systems are compared in Section 3. After
introducing secession as a possible outcome in Section 4, Section 5 studies
when secession will be chosen over unified schooling. Next, we study wel-
fare (Section 6) and extend the model to alternative forms of heterogeneity
(Section 7). Finally, in section 8 we confront the predictions of our model
with the cases of 19th century France and Spain. Most proofs are relegated
to the appendix.
2 The Model
We study a country with two regions  = 1 2. In each region, there are
three social groups, namely the masses  = 1 +2 and the elite which
is split into the landowners  = 1+2 and the bourgeoisie  = 1+2.
Political power is in the hands of one of the elite groups, which is referred
to as the “dominant” group. The dominant group holds power for historical
reasons and is not necessarily the majority elite group. Moreover, while
there is one dominant group at the country level, this group is not necessarily
dominant in both regions. Let    + We normalize the total size of
the elite in the country to  +  = 1. For simplicity, we assume that in
both regions both the landowners and the masses have the same size, i.e.
1 = 2 = 2 and 1 = 2 = 2 . Instead, one region is characterised by
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a larger bourgeoisie than the other, and this region is assumed to be region
1, without loss of generality (i.e., 1  2).
Value is created through bilateral production between members of the
elites and members of the masses. Initially, the country is a "rural" society.
Production takes place only within each region and the surplus from each
match is normalized to 1. The bargaining power of the masses is given by
 which simply implies in our framework that a member of the masses who
is matched to a member of the elite keeps  of the surplus generated from
the match.
This rural society is now hit by a productivity shock representing the
industrial revolution. If the new technology is implemented, the match pro-
ductivity in the agrarian sector (landowner-masses) increases to 1+ while
the match productivity in the industrial sector representing a match between
a bourgeois and the masses increases to 1 +  where   1. However, the
increase in productivity only occurs if the member of the masses attends
school. Otherwise, the productivity of the match remains equal to 1. In
other words, the implementation of the new technology requires schooling
of the masses.
The set-up of a schooling system can only be financed by the elites, but
the masses decide whether to attend school or not.
There are two periods in our model: in the first period the productivity
shock is observed and the schooling decision is made. If schooling is im-
plemented, production takes only place in the second period. If schooling
is not implemented, production takes place in both periods but the match
productivity stays equal to one. All agents have a discount factor of .
2.1 Payoﬀs if schools are not implemented
Let Ψ ( = ) denote the payoﬀ for group  members when schooling
is not implemented. In this case, any member of the elite produces an output
of 1 with each of the 2 members of the masses living in his region, and
gets a proportion 1− of the output. As a result, the payoﬀ of a landonwer
is the same as that of a bourgeois and is given by
Ψ = Ψ = (1− )(1 + )
2
. (1)
For a member of the masses in region , the pay-oﬀ is:
Ψ = (1 + )
µ
2
+
¶
(2)
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i.e. the member of the masses receives  from each match with one of
the 2 landowners in the region as well as from each match with the 
bourgeois living in region .
2.2 Schools
The dominant group chooses whether or not schooling is implemented and
how to split the schooling costs among the elite. We assume that the dom-
inant group cannot force the dominated group to pay for schooling if with
this payment the dominated group would be made worse-oﬀ than under no
schooling. This implies that the maximum schooling costs that can be im-
posed on the dominated elite group leave this group indiﬀerent between the
implementation of schooling and the absence of schools.
We also assume that each of the elite groups acts as a single group at
the country level, i.e. each group equally shares across regions the benefits
from production and the costs from schooling.
Schools can be implemented either in both regions, or in one region only.
The implementation of schools in both regions creates a common identity
across regions, which enables the masses of each region to produce with
the bourgeois from both regions. This is referred to as nation building or
a "unified" schooling system, and denoted by  . Instead, if schooling is
implemented only in one region, no common identity is created, and thus
the masses of each region can only produce with the bourgeois of the same
region. This is referred to as a "regional" schooling system, and denoted
by  ( = 1 2). In both cases, the masses can only produce with the
landowners of their region of origin.
2.2.1 Payoﬀs from schooling
Let Π denote the payoﬀs from schooling for group  =  under
organizational system  = . Similarly, denote by  the cost of setting
up schooling system  for a member of the elite group  = . We can
next calculate the benefits from schooling for each group under the diﬀerent
systems.
When attending school in a unified system, any member of the masses
foregoes production in the first period and appropriates in the second period
(discounted by ) a fraction  of the amount 1+ produced with each of the
2 landowners in his region and the same fraction of the amount 1 + 
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produced with each of the  bourgeois in the country:
Π = 
µ
(1 + )
2
+ (1 + )
¶
 = 1 2. (3)
Similarly, any bourgeois pays  schooling set-up costs, and appropriates a
fraction 1−  of the amount 1 +  produced with the  members of the
mass in period 2, i.e.,
Π = − + (1− )(1 + ) , (4)
while the landowner’s payoﬀ depends on its own investment  and is asso-
ciated to a lower match productivity (1 + ) and to a smaller pool of mass
members than for the bourgeois, namely the 2 mass members living in
the landowner’s region:
Π = − + (1− )(1 + )2 . (5)
Under region- schooling, the payoﬀ of any member of the masses in
region  is
Π = 
µ
(1 + )
2
+ (1 + )
¶
 = 1 2. (6)
where the only diﬀerence with (3) is that only within region- production is
possible.
In turn, each of the  region- bourgeois gets (1 − )(1 + ) in the
second period with each of the 2 educated members of the masses in
that region, while each of the − bourgeois in region − gets (1 + ) with
the 2 uneducated masses of region −. Then, given cross-subsidization
across regions within the countrywide bourgeoisie, the payoﬀ of a bourgeois
is given by the weighted average of these two terms minus the setting-up
cost  , i.e.
Π = − + (1− ) ((1 + ) + (1 + )−) 2 for  = 1 2. (7)
Finally, each of the 2 region- landowners gets (1−)(1+) with each of
the 2 educated masses of that region, while each of the 2 landowners
in region − gets (1+ )(1− ) with each of the 2 uneducated masses of
region −, which leads to the following payoﬀ for each landowner
Π = − + (1− ) ( + 1 + 2)4 for  = 1 2. (8)
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2.3 Education thresholds for the elites
In this subsection we study the minimum size of the productivity shock that
makes the elite willing to provide schooling under the assumption that the
masses have to get schooled when schools are built.5
The minimum productivity shock that makes the elite indiﬀerent be-
tween implementing unified schools or not is such that Ψ = Π with = . From (1), (4), and (5), the thresholds for the bourgeoisie and
the landowners are:
 = 
 + (1− )(1− )2
(1− ) (9)
 = 2
 + (1− )
(1− ) (10)
Similarly, from (1), (7), and (8), the thresholds under region- schooling
are
 =
2  + (1− )
(1− ) for  = 1 2 (11)
 =
4 + (1− )
(1− ) for  = 1 2 (12)
All these thresholds depend on how much the elite has to pay for setting
up the schools. We assume that the cost of each schooling system is pro-
portional to the number of students attending schools and for expositional
purposes set marginal schooling costs equal to 1.
The dominant elite group  determines how the costs of education are
split within the elite under education system . However, the dominant
group  cannot oblige the dominated group − to pay for education if this
payment makes the dominated group worse-oﬀ than under no schooling.
In other words, the dominant group will always try to make the dominant
group pay the maximum amount possible for education. When the dominant
group chooses to implement schooling, the following cases are possible:
1. Education is suﬃciently beneficial for the dominated group to be will-
ing to pay the entire cost of education. In that case, the dominant
group gets education for free.
5 If the masses have a choice whether or not to get schooled, we will additionally get a
minimum productivity shock that makes the masses willing to get schooled. In this case
schooling is implemented only if the productivity shock lies above the maximum of the
minimum thresholds by the masses and the elites.
9
2. The dominant group has to cofinance education and pay e after forc-
ing the dominated group to pay the maximum acceptable amount
− leaving the dominated group indiﬀerent between schooling and
no schooling.
3. The dominated group is unwilling to pay anything for education but
the dominant group is better-oﬀ with education even if it pays all the
cost.
Which cases will result clearly depends on the productivity shocks. The
higher these shocks, the higher the potential benefits from schooling and
the higher the potential willingness to pay for schooling by the dominated
group. The following cutoﬀs will be relevant for the analysis:
Notation 1 We denote by
• c the minimum productivity shock making elite group  willing to pay
the entire cost of schooling.
• f the minimum productivity shock making elite group  willing to
cofinance education paying e when group − is paying its maximum
willingness −
•  the minimum productivity shock making elite group  willing to
implement education without paying.
The exact values for these shocks and payments under the diﬀerent ed-
ucational systems can be found in Table 1 in Appendix A. Lemma 1 shows
that two diﬀerent rankings of the thresholds are possible depending on the
attractiveness of schooling for the bourgeoisie relative to the landowners.
Lemma 1 For  = 
1.     f = f  min hc ci if 2  
2.   c    c if 2  
where  is given by
 = (1− ) (2− 1 + ) (13)
 = 2(1− ) (− 1) (14)
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Proof. By simple algebra.
For a given investment in education, the gain from schooling for the
bourgeoisie is larger than for the landowners because the bourgeoisie ex-
periences a larger productivity increase than landowners and because it is
the only group that might gain production partners with schooling. This
explains why    always holds.
The attractiveness of schooling for the bourgeoisie relative to the landown-
ers is particularly high when (i)  is very high, i.e. the bourgeoisie has a big
productivity advantage over landowners, (ii) the agents discount the future
to a small extent, as the future gains for schooling are higher for the bour-
geoisie than for the landowners, and (iii) the size of the bourgeoisie is large,
as the per capita burden from education for a bourgeois is reduced. For this
reason, when   2 is satisfied, the thresholds of the landowners are sys-
tematically larger than the thresholds of the bourgeoisie, and, in particular,c   holds, i.e. a bourgeoisie bearing the full cost of education is more
willing to set up schools than a landowner that does not have to pay any
cost. Instead, for   2, the attractiveness of education is more similar for
both groups, and c   . In this case the threshold for paying fully for
education of the bourgeoisie c might be bigger than that of the landownersc despite the extra gains from schooling for the bourgeoisie. This happens
in particular if the bourgeoisie is small relative to the landowners, as in that
case the per bourgeois cost of education is high.
Within groups, the payoﬀ from schooling for a given elite group in a
given schooling system  is decreasing in the amount paid by the group.
2.4 Provision of education by the elite
We are now in a position to represent the decision on education provision
by the elite under the assumption that the masses have to follow suit6 in a
given organizational form .7
6Whether or not the masses want to follow suit will be analyzed in Subsection 2.5.
7We will see later on that this analysis also applies to secession (Section 4)
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2.4.1 Bourgeoisie dominant
Figure 1 represents the decision on education provision by the elites when
the bourgeoisie is dominant and   2. For   c the landowners are
willing to pay the full cost of education, and thus the bourgeoisie puts the
full burden on them. For f = f    c , the bourgeoisie can only
impose part of the investment on the landowners, namely  ≥ 0 and has
to finance the rest of the payment f. Instead, for   f = f education
is not provided by the elites.
In turn, Figure 2 represents the outcome for   2, a situation in which
the payoﬀs from education for the bourgeoisie relative to the landowners are
particularly high. In this case, the elite is willing to provide education if
and only if   c The main diﬀerence with the preceding case is that forc     , the bourgeoisie is willing to provide education even if it has
12
the bear the full burden. In addition, in this area, the landowners become
actually worse-oﬀ after the implementation of education.
2.4.2 Landowners dominant
Figure 3 represents the case where the landowners are dominant and  2.
In this case, the elite is willing to provide education if and only if   e .
This provision is fully financed by the bourgeoisie if   c and partially
financed by each group otherwise (f  )
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For   2, education is provided if and only if    and always fully
funded by the bourgeoisie.
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A simple look at the figures reveals that for   2 the elite agrees
when to provide education (Figures 1 and 3). However, for   2 (Figures
2 and 4), the bourgeoisie is willing to fully finance education when the
landowners do not even want education (c   ), hence the bourgeoisie
will provide education earlier than the landowners if the masses had to follow
suit. We next study whether the masses want to follow suit and get schooled
voluntarily.
2.5 School attendance by the masses
The masses of region  are willing to get educated whenever the payoﬀs from
schooling are higher than the payoﬀs from no-schooling, i.e. Π ≥ Ψ .
This leads to a minimum threshold on the size of the productivity shock
for the masses to be willing to get educated. Equalizing (2) and (3), the
threshold for unified schooling is:
 =
1
 −
2 ( − + −)
 ( + 2) for  = 1 2. (15)
Similarly, from (2) and (6), the threshold for region- schooling is:
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 =
1
 −
2 (− 1)
 ( + 2) for  = 1 2 (16)
Due to the increased match pool, the masses from the any given region
are willing to get schooled earlier under unified than under regional schooling
(   for  = 1 2).
Even under the same system the masses of the two regions have a diﬀer-
ent willingness to get schooled. Specifically, the masses of the region with a
larger bourgeoisie have a higher productivity cutoﬀ under unified schooling
and instead a lower cutoﬀ under regional schooling (1  2 ⇔ 11 
22 ⇔ 1  2). The underlying intuition is as follows. Under unified
schooling, the masses can get matched to the bourgeoisie of both regions,
hence the increase in the match pool is larger for the masses belonging to
the region with a smaller bourgeoisie, which explains why they are willing
to get schooled sooner. Instead, under regional schooling, the match pool
is unchanged after education and thus the productivity gain stemming from
schooling is larger for those masses which have already access to a larger
bourgeoisie.
Since unified schooling requires the masses of both regions to be willing
to get educated, the cutoﬀ of the masses that are less willing to get schooled,
namely the masses of region 1, 1 determines when unified schooling is pos-
sible for the masses. In addition, given that 1  11 , regional education
of the masses is never possible before unified schooling.
2.6 Equilibrium education
Lemma 2 shows that the incentives of the masses are irrelevant for the
implementation of schooling:
Lemma 2 Education always pays oﬀ for the masses when it does for the
elite.
Proof. See appendix B.
Therefore, the incentives of the elites alone determine the implementa-
tion of schooling.
Proposition 1 For   2 schooling is implemented for   f inde-
pendently of the identity of the dominant group. For   2 schooling is
implemented earlier (specifically, for   c) when the bourgeoisie is domi-
nant than when landowners are dominant (implemented for     c).
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For   2 the implementation of schooling depends on the identity of
the dominant group when     c. Landowners do not benefit from
schooling and will not implement schools if dominant while the bourgeoisie
benefits that much that it is willing to fully finance schools if it is in a
position to do so.
So far we have taken the potential educational system as given. However,
the dominant elite will not only decide whether or not to choose unified
schooling.
3 Unified vs. Region- education
Under regional education, either region-1 or region-2 might become edu-
cated. The thresholds of all groups to get educated are weakly lower under
regional education in region 1 than in region 2. Moreover, 1  2 .
Therefore
Lemma 3 The dominant elite always prefer region−1 schooling to region−2
schooling.
Proof. See appendix C.
The intuition for this is simple: as the size of the nobility is the same
in both regions, the productivity gains are larger when the masses with the
larger bourgeoisie get educated. The bourgeoisie prefers this option as the
return will be larger and dominant landowners because they will be able to
extract a larger payment from the bourgeois.
However unified schooling is even better: the cost-savings by sending
only one region to school do not outweigh the benefits from higher pro-
ductivity in both regions and the increased match pool, as shown in the
following lemma:
Lemma 4 The dominant elite always prefers unified schooling to region−
schooling.
Proof. See appendix C.
It is easy to see that regional schooling in both regions is also dominated
by unified schooling. Schooling both regions costs the same than unified
schooling, but there is no regional mobility and hence the bourgeoisie loses
out on the increased match pool across regions.
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4 Secession
So far, we have assumed the existence of inter-regional transfers within elite
groups leading to a perfect equalization of payoﬀs across regions within
elite groups. In this section, we study whether the region- dominant elite
has actually incentives to avoid such redistribution by accompanying the
implementation of schooling in region  by the political secession of this
region. We assume that after region- secession, no cross-border production
can take place.
Since there are no interregional matches after secession, the cutoﬀs for
the masses to be willing to go to school under region- secession (denoted by
) are the same than under regional education, i.e. 11 = 11  22 =
22 . Instead, the payoﬀ of region- bourgeoisie associated to implementing
schooling through secession are:
Π = − + (1− )(1 + )

2
(17)
i.e., the region-bourgeoisie invests  in the set-up of schools in its region
and gets the proceeds from the future high-productivity matches with region-
masses. Similarly, the payoﬀ from region- secession for region- landowners
is:
Π = − + (1− )(1 + )

2
 (18)
Equalizing (17) and (18) respectively to (1), the productivity thresholds for
the implementation of schooling with region- secession are:
 =
2
(1− ) +
1
 (19)
 =
2
(1− ) +
1
 (20)
Following the same steps as in section 2.3 and taking into account that
educational costs are only paid by the regional elite, Table 1 in appendix
A displays the cutoﬀs for free education, full payment and partial payment
and the corresponding educational costs under . It turns out that while
educational costs diﬀer, the cutoﬀs are the same as under regional schooling.
Therefore Lemma 1 extends also to  =  with  =  and again we
have two possible regimes depending on the profitability of schooling for the
bourgeoisie relative to the landowners.
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5 Secession versus unified schooling
We next study the choice between secession and unified schooling. As
landowners do not benefit by the extra cross-regional matches generated
under unified schooling, from (5) and (18), we have that
Π ≥ Π ⇔  ≤  (21)
i.e. landowners will prefer the system with the lowest educational cost.
This implies in particular that if they are to fully finance education under
both systems, they will be indiﬀerent between the two schooling systems as
secession halves the number of mass members to be educated but also the
number of landowners financing education, i.e.  = 22 =  =  .
Instead, secession compared to unified schooling restricts the number of
matches for the bourgeois, which implies that secession will be preferred by
the bourgeois only if it generates a suﬃciently large reduction in costs. Note
however that, as for landowners, the relevant cost is not the total expendi-
ture in schooling, but the expenditure per member of the bourgeoisie: when
going from unified schooling to region- secession, the number of bourgeois
financing education falls from  to , which implies that the cost per bour-
geois will not fall a lot unless  is very big. Mathematically, from (4) and
(17), the condition under which secession is preferred is given by:
Π ≥ Π ⇔  −  ≥ (1 + )(1− )

2
. (22)
Clearly, as the costs of education are crucial in the secession decision
and these costs partly depend on the identity of the dominant group, the
choice between these two systems is likely to depend on the identity of the
dominant group at the country and regional level. Subsections 5.1 and 5.2
study the equilibrium when respectively the bourgeoisie and landowners are
dominant both at the country and regional level, while subsections 5.3 and
5.4 consider in turn the two cases in which the identity of the dominant
group at the country and regional level is not the same.
5.1 Bourgeoisie always dominant
Proposition 2 shows that for a bourgeoisie dominant both at the regional
and country level, cost saving from secession is never suﬃcient to oﬀset the
associated forgone productive matches.
Proposition 2 A regionally and countrywide dominant bourgeoisie always
prefers unified schooling to secession.
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Proof. See Appendix D.1
In order to provide intuition for this result, Figure 5 compares for one
of the three possible parameter configurations (2     ) the payoﬀs
from schooling under unified education (dashed line) and secession (continu-
ous line) for the bourgeois and the landowners. For high enough productivity
levels (  b), the landowners are willing to pay for the entire cost of edu-
cation under both systems, and thus the bourgeois choose unified schooling
as the additional matches under unified schooling can be obtained at no
extra cost. In turn, for     b , the landowners are willing to pay
the same amount of cost (per mass member) under both systems, and the
rest needs to be paid for by the bourgeois. Then, as unified schooling is
characterized by a larger set of matches for the bourgeois, the bourgeois’
payoﬀs after the payment of these costs is higher under unified schooling.
For lower productivity values (b    ), landowners are not any-
more willing to contribute to education as this would make them worse-oﬀ,
but bourgeois still implement schooling under both systems paying the full
cost. Unified schooling is always preferred as the potential saving in terms
of set-up cost stemming from secession —occuring only when the seceding
region has a large bourgeoisie- is never suﬃcient to compensate for the loss
of matches. Finally, for b    b schools are set up only under unified
schooling, and so the bourgeoisie favours this system.8
8The two other parameter specifications are similar, except that there is no parameter
area in which full payment by the bourgeoisie simultaneously arises as an equilibrium under
both systems, and there is instead a situation in which partial payment by the bourgeoisie
under unified schooling arises at the same time as no schooling under secession.
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5.2 Landowners dominant always
As the payoﬀ from schooling to landowners is the same under both sys-
tems, dominant landowners will simply choose the system that allows them
to transfer a larger share of the cost of schooling to the bourgeois. As the
bourgeoisie benefits more from schooling under unified education, the bour-
geoisie will be willing to pay a larger share of the cost under this system,
and landowners will always weakly prefer unified schooling to secession:
Proposition 3 Regionally and countrywide dominant landowners always
weakly prefer unified schooling to secession.
Proof. See Appendix D.1.
Specifically, for high enough productivity levels, the bourgeoisie will be
willing to fully finance education under both systems, in which case landown-
ers are indiﬀerent between them. However, for intermediate productivity lev-
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els, full or even partial financing will only be possible under unified schooling,
and landowners will choose unified schooling for that reason.
5.3 Landowners are dominant at country level, bourgeoisie
is dominant in region 
If the landowners are dominant at the country level but the bourgeoisie is
dominant in region , the bourgeoisie might want region  to separate. Specif-
ically, the trade-oﬀ facing the bourgeoisie is as follows: on the one hand, if
unified schooling can be implemented, secession leads to the loss of valuable
match partners in region − (a loss that is increasing in ).On the other,
the bourgeoisie can shift educational costs to the landowners under secession
while it bears most of the costs under unified schooling as it is dominated
by the landowners under that system. Hence if secession stands a chance
against unified schooling, it has to be for relatively low productivity shocks
— otherwise, the loss of potential partners would be too costly- but still high
enough for education under secession to be profitable for the bourgeoisie.
This intuition is confirmed in Proposition 4 which characterizes the equi-
librium outcome since the masses are willing to get educated whenever the
elite is willing to implement education.
Proposition 4 A region- dominant but country-level-dominated bourgeoisie
chooses region- secession if and only if (i) schooling is implemented under
secession but not under unified schooling, or (ii) the productivity shock 
takes intermediate values and some further conditions are satisfied (see Ap-
pendix D.2.1 for the specific values and conditions).
Proof. See Appendix D.2.1
Part (i) in the proposition applies when schooling under secession is
so beneficial for the regionally dominant bourgeoisie that it is profitable
for them to implement it even paying the full cost schooling. Instead, the
landowners are made worse oﬀ by schooling and for this reason choose not
to implement school if they dominate under unified schooling.9 However,
once unified schooling becomes implementable, the bourgeoisie prefers being
dominated under unified schooling over being dominant under secession due
to the increased match pool under unified schooling.
As for Part (ii), Figure 6 illustrates one case where there exists a range
of intermediate productivity shocks for which region- bourgeoisie favours
9This happens for 2   when      .
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secession.10 Indeed for low enough productivity levels, unified schoolig is
preferred either because schooling is simply not profitable under secession
(for e    e ) or because landowners’ willingness to pay under secession
is limited (for e    2). Symetrically, for high enough productivity
levels (  ), unified schooling dominates as the gain associated to hav-
ing additional production partners is very high. Instead, for intermediate
values (2    ), region- bourgeoisie chooses to secede because it
has to pay little for education under secession compared to unified schooling
( =  while  is either small or zero) and this actually outweighs the
higher production under unified schooling.
More generally, the specific range of intermediate productivity shocks for
which secession is chosen depends on the size of region- bourgeoisie. Indeed,
while only half of the masses get educated under secession, the associated
per bourgeois cost is smaller the larger the bourgeoisie of the seceding region.
Other parameters which make the results case specific are the regional size
10This case holds when 2     ,   2 and    are simultaneously
verified.
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of the bourgeoisie compared to the landowners —since the bourgeoisie shifts
educational costs to the landowners- and the productivity advantage of the
bourgeoisie.
While the bourgeoisie might prefer secession, the landowners never prefer
to be dominated under secession to being dominant under unified education.
This happens because from their viewpoint the only diﬀerence between the
two systems are the educational costs and these are always higher under
secession.
5.4 Bourgeoisie is dominant at country level, landowners are
dominant in region 
Since the landowners do not benefit from regional mobility, they prefer seces-
sion whenever their educational costs under secession are lower than under
unified education. This indeed happens if landowners are dominated at the
state level but dominant in region .
Proposition 5 Landowners who are dominant at the region  level but dom-
inated at the state level, always prefer secession of region  whenever edu-
cation is implementable under secession. Hence only for productivity shocks
for which unified education is implementable but education under secession
is not, do we observe unified education.
Proof. See Appendix D.2.2.
The landowners prefer secession because they are the dominant group
under secession and therefore can shift (part of) the educational costs to
the bourgeoisie and hence implement schooling paying less than under the
unified system when more people get schooled and they are the main bearers
of the educational cost.11
We are now in a position to summarize our results. Secession can only
be an equilibrium outcome if it implies a change in the dominant group. It
will always result when education under secession is implementable when
the landowners are dominant under secession but dominated at the country
level. If it is the bourgeoisie that is dominant under secession but dominated
at the country level, secession might occur only for intermediate productivity
shocks. In the latter case it will also occur when schooling under secession is
implementable and fully financed by the dominant bourgeoisie while unified
schooling does not occur since the landowners are worse oﬀ under schooling.
11The bourgeoisie never prefers being dominated under secession to being dominant
under the unitary system: it loses valuable match partners and is the main bearer of
educational costs.
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We next study how our equilibria do in terms of welfare.
6 Welfare
The value of welfare in our model is obtained by adding up individual utility
levels. In the absence of schooling welfare is given by
 = 
2
Ψ + 2 Ψ− +Ψ +Ψ 
which using (1), and (2) simplifies to:
 = 
2
(1 + ), (23)
i.e. in every period elite members are matched to the masses of their region
and produce one unit of output. How the production is split is a simple
transfer from one group to the other and does not enter the expression.
Under unified schooling, welfare becomes:
 = 
2
Π +

2
Π− +Π +Π 
which simplifies to
 = − +
µ
(1 + )
2
+ (1 + )
¶
 (24)
using (3), (4), and (5). The direct cost of unified schooling is − , as the
cost of schooling is proportional to the number of mass members taking edu-
cation, all mass members attend school under this system and the per person
cost is normalized to 1. In addition, the opportunity cost from schooling is
reflected in the fact that there is no first period production and all produc-
tion is thus discounted. As for the benefits, productivity is now higher (1+
and 1+ in the matches with respectively landowners and bourgeois) and
the masses can now produce with the entire bourgeoisie.
The social planner prefers unified schooling to no schooling if and only
if    or equivalently when
   = 2− (2+  − 1) ( + 2) +
1
 (25)
This cutoﬀ (25) decreases in ,  and  as schooling is more beneficial
the more the future matters, the bigger the bourgeoisie, and the higher the
productivity gains.
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Next, we check when the planner prefers regional schooling or secession
to no schooling. Clearly, as the planner maximises utilitarian welfare and
the payoﬀs of the agents are linear, distributional issues are irrelevant, and
the implementation of schooling in one region and secession of that region
are indistinguishable from a welfare viewpoint. If region  is the only region
that gets educated, welfare under secession or regional schooling is given by
 = 
2
Π +

2
Ψ− +Π +Π
which simplifies to
 = −
2
+

2
(1 + )
µ
− + 
2
¶
+ 
2
µ
2
(1 + ) +(1 + )
¶
:
(26)
The direct cost of education is now given by 2 , while one unit of the good is
produced in each period by each of the 2 members of the masses in region− with the regional elite −+ 2 and production in region  is confined to
the second period but with a higher productivity (1+ with the landowners
and 1 +  with the bourgeois).
Subtracting (23) from (26), the planner prefers education in one region
to no education if and only if:
   =
1 + + 2
 ¡ + 2 ¢ . (27)
Comparing 1 and 2 , one gets also that the planner prefers the
implementation of schooling in the region with the larger bourgeoisie (region
1): indeed, while the cost of schooling is the same in both regions given that
the size of the masses is identical, the larger productivity gains of the masses
in their matches with bourgeois imply it is socially better to educated the
masses in the region with a larger bourgeoisie.12
In the first best, i.e. when the planner is able to enforce the welfare
maximising schooling under each system, the following proposition holds:13
Proposition 6 Under centralisation, unified schooling yields higher welfare
than regional schooling and secession.
12Mathematically, 1  2 holds if   1 =  , which is always satisfied.
13As it is easy to show that 2  1   and  =    for  = 1 2,
the masses are always willing to attend school whenever the central planner wants this to
be the case.
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Proof. See appendix E.1
This result simply comes from our assumption that unified schooling
leads to an increased match pool as it renders inter-regional production
among masses and bourgeois possible.
However, in the general, the central planner will not be able to control
the school set-up investments made by landowners and bourgeois. If the
elites are willing to finance unified schooling, this system will still be chosen
by the central planner. However, if the elites are not willing to implement
that system and they are instead willing to implement regional schooling or
secession, the central planner may prefer this option if for the corresponding
parameter area education in one region is socially better than no education.
In order to determine the second best educational system for diﬀerent
productivity levels, we thus need first to compare the
This result also implies that secession is never socially optimal if unified
education is implementable. The social planner does not care about trans-
fers among groups, but values the increased match pool and therefore the
additional productivity gains due to nation building. Therefore whenever
secession displaces nation building due to a change in dominant group un-
der secession the result is harmful from a social point of view. However,
if the country-level-dominant landowners do not implement education and
the regionally dominant bourgeoisie prefers secession, secession might be so-
cially better than no education. This requires that the cutoﬀ for which it is
beneficial to the social planner to implement education in one region only,
namely  , is lower than  = 1 .
Next, Proposition 7 checks whether the implementation of unified school-
ing in the decentralized equilibrium is socially eﬃcient:
Proposition 7 The equilibrium education level under unified schooling can
be socially ineﬃcient. Undereducation arises under a wide set of parame-
ters, while overeducation can arise only if the bourgeoisie is dominant, the
payoﬀs from schooling for the bourgeoisie are high relative to the payoﬀs of
the landowners and the productivity takes intermediate values as specified in
Appendix E.2.
Proof. See Appendix E.2
The main intuition behind the ineﬃcient provision of unified schooling
is simply that the politically dominant elite does not internalize the benefits
from schooling for the other elite and for the masses. More specifically, the
solid line in Figure 7 represents the socially eﬃcient productivity threshold
( ) for the provision of education for diﬀerent values of the productivity
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advantage in matches involving the bourgeoisie () while the dashed (resp.
dotted) line represents the equilibrium threshold under unified schooling
when the bourgeoisie (resp. landowners) are the dominant group.14
Equilibrium education under the unified system is eﬃcient decision no
matter the identity of the dominant group in area I (no education) and
area V (education), while in area IV the eﬃcient choice is made only if the
bourgeoisie is the dominant group. In area II, education is eﬃcient, but is
never implemented because the bourgeois do not take into account the gains
education generates for landowners. Instead, in area III there is actually
overeducation under unified schooling if the bourgeoisie dominates; specifi-
cally, the bourgeois fully finance education and make landowners worse-oﬀ
than under no education as the productivity gain for landowners is too low
to cover for the loss of first period production while the masses take edu-
cation. As this loss is not internalised by the bourgeois, the equilibrium is
14We have assumed that  = 01,  = 095, 1 = 025,  = 04, and  = 2. The
threshold for a dominant bourgeoisie (dashed line) is given by  for   2 and by 
for   2 and the threshold for landowners (dotted line) by  for   2 and by 
for   2 (see figures 1 to 4).
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characterized by excess education.
The same type of argument holds regarding the eﬃciency of decentralised
education under region- schooling or secession, but overeducation arises
only for higher values of the bourgeoisie’s productivity advantage () than
under unified schooling given that the bourgeoisie does not gain produc-
tion partners under these systems. Figure A1 in the appendix provides an
example of the diﬀerent cases arising.
This result also implies that secession is never socially optimal if unified
education is implementable. The social planner does not care about trans-
fers among groups, but values the increased match pool and therefore the
additional productivity gains due to nation building. Therefore whenever
secession displaces nation building due to a change in dominant group un-
der secession the result is harmful from a social point of view. However,
if the country-level-dominant landowners do not implement education and
the regionally dominant bourgeoisie prefers secession, secession might be so-
cially better than no education. This requires that the cutoﬀ for which it is
beneficial to the social planner to implement education in one region only,
namely  , is lower than  = 1 .
Proposition 8 Secession is never socially optimal if unified schooling can
be implemented. When unified schooling cannot be implemented (because
landowners are dominant and do not want to implement nation building) but
a regionally dominant bourgeoisie implements secession (i.e. for   2
and b    ), secession is a second best for max[  b ]    .
Proof. See Appendix E.4
However, for   2 secession will be implemented whenever the na-
tionwide dominant landowners suﬀer from education but the regionally dom-
inant bourgeoisie benefits so much that they are willing to self-finance re-
gional schooling, hence for all productivity shocks such that b     .
This can lead to over- or underprovision of secession.15 If the losses of the
landowners do not outweigh the gains of the bourgeoisie and the masses from
regional education, the equilibrium outcome leads to too much secession. If
the trade-oﬀ is resolved the other way round, secession does not occur often
enough. In Appendix E.5 we provide numerical examples for both cases.
15 If    , then there is too little secession for      , while there is
socially too much secession for      if    .
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The above analysis shows that equilibrium secession can be a second-best
when education is particularly beneficial for the bourgeoisie which is domi-
nated at the state level but dominant in one region. But even in this case,
secession might occur too often or not often enough. However, when seces-
sion is implemented by regionally dominant landowners who are dominated
at the state level it is never socially desirable.
7 Robustness
The above results are derived assuming one dimension of heterogeneity,
namely the size of the bourgeoisie was bigger in region 1 than in region
2. In this section we briefly discuss other forms of heterogeneity. As before
we will assume that the regions are identical except in one dimension. The
dimensions we look at are the size of the masses / landowners and the size
of the productivity shock that hits the two regions representing diﬀerent
arrival rates of industrialization.
If the heterogeneity stems from the size of the masses across regions, the
minimum productivity shock necessary for the masses to be willing to get
region− schooling or unified schooling respectively does not vary across
regions. As before the masses will be willing to attend unified schooling
whenever they are willing to attend regional schooling. Under region−
education the elite of the bigger  region benefits more from education,
but educating this region is also more costly since more individuals have
to be schooled. Unified schooling will lead to less than double education
costs and big benefits due to the mobility of the masses. This leads to
stable nation building for suﬃciently high productivity shocks and makes
secession less likely than in our benchmark setting.
It is easy to see that our results are robust to the case when it is the
size of the landowners that diﬀers across regions. The main diﬀerence to
the benchmark model is that now the cutoﬀs for education under secession
do not diﬀer across regions for the elite. The masses in the region with the
smaller group of landowners are willing to get educated earlier in each system
and they are still willing to get education in the unified system before they
are willing to get educated regionally or under secession. Also, as before,
the masses are still willing to get educated whenever the elite is willing to
implement education.
Finally, asymmetric industrialization shocks across regions hinder nation
building and originate an additional channel leading to secession at equilib-
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rium.16 Specifically, we assume that intra-regional match productivity is
determined by the regional productivity shock, while across-regional match
productivity is determined by the lower productivity shock, either because
the available production technology of the bourgeoisie is determined by the
lower productivity shock or because the masses were trained for the lower
productivity shock only. In that set-up, regional schooling in the high-
productivity region is more attractive for all groups than regional schooling
in the low-productivity region. Moreover, the bigger the relative diﬀerence
across region, the more likely it is that regional education dominates uni-
fied schooling. In addition, since transfers to the less eﬃcient region can be
avoided by secession, a very unequal speed of industrialization makes nation
building across both regions impossible and is likely to lead to secession.
8 Case Study: Spain versus France
In this section, we relate our model to the cases of 19th century France and
Spain. At the beginning of the 19th century, both countries were similar at
least along some characteristics relevant to our model.
Specifically, both countries had a very similar per capita GDP at the be-
ginning of the century17 and were characterized by a heterogeneous language
composition. Indeed, in 1794 only about 40% of the French population were
native French speakers18 (Calvet 2002, p. 218), while an important propor-
tion of the Spanish population had a language other than Spanish/Castilian
(i.e. Catalan, Galician, Basque, or Bable) as their mothertongue in 1787.19
16 In the model this could be represented by diﬀerent  or by diﬀerent .
17According to Tortella (1994, p. 2) Spain’s per capita GDP was 2% higher than France’s
in 1800, and 7% lower in 1820. According to Maddison (2003, pp. 58-67), France’ s GDP
was higher by 11% in 1820.
18Among the other language groups, the largest was Occitan and next came Breton
and Alsacian. Additionally, small minorities were speaking Franco-provençal, Basque,
Catalan, Corsican, or Flemish.
19There are no available data on the language composition of Spain at the end of the 18th
century. However, one can do a back of the envelope computation to get an upper bound
for the proportion of non-Spanish speakers. According to Linz (1975), historically Spanish
has also been spoken by part of the population in those regions where Catalan, Galician, or
Basque were also spoken. Instead, these three languages were geographically concentrated
in certain provinces (Barcelona, Tarragona, Lleida, Girona, Valencia, Castellon, Alicante,
and the Balearic Islands, for Catalan; A Coruna, Lugo, Ourense, and Pontevedra, for
Galician; and Gipuzkoa, Bizkaia, Araba, and Navarre for Basque). Using data on the
population of provinces in the 1787 Census (INE, 1991), an upper bound for the proportion
of Catalan, Galician, Basque, and Bable speakers is respectively 18%, 13%, 5%, and 3%,
and thus a lower bound for the proportion of Spanish speakers is 61%.
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Another common characteristic is that the first industries were geographi-
cally concentrated. In France, the first industries were mostly concentrated
in the North-East (Crayen and Baten, 2010), and in the case of Spain they
were mostly concentrated in Catalonia and in the Basque Country (Tortella,
2000).
Despite these common features, France and Spain ended up having very
diﬀerent outcomes in terms of industrialization, with France’s per capita
GDP becoming 1.7 times that of Spain in 1930.20 The outcomes were also
very diﬀerent in terms of nation-building, as in the historical literature,
France is often used as a benchmark of successful nation-building (see e.g.
Kroneberg and Wimmer, 2012) while Spain is seen as an example of un-
accomplished nation-building process accompanied with the emergence of
peripheral nationalisms (see e.g. Linz, 1974, 1975; Keating, 1993). When
elections were held, peripheral nationalist parties were systematically repre-
sented in the Spanish Parliament since the end of the 19th century. Instead,
the success (or even the existence) of regionalist/nationalist parties in Al-
sace, Brittany, Corsica, or the French parts of the Basque Country or Cat-
alonia has been extremely limited. For instance, in the June 1931 Spanish
legislative elections, the Catalan nationalist parties obtained almost three
fourths of the Catalan constituencies, and their Galician regionalist and
Basque nationalist counterparts respectively 40 per cent and one third of
the Galician and Basque constituencies (see Tusell, 1982).21 In contrast,
in the first round of the April 1928 French legislative elections, regionalist
candidates were only present in Alsace and obtained 4 seats with 15.9% of
the votes: overall, the French Parliament consisted of 4 regionalist deputies
out of 612 (see Lachapelle, 1928).
In terms of our model, we can consider that the two regions character-
izing France are the industrializing North-East and the agricultural South-
West, as defined for instance by the “St-Malo-Geneva line” identified by
some Historians (see e.g. Weber, 1976). In addition, it is safe to assume
that the bourgeoisie was the dominant elite both in the North-East and
20Measured in 1970 U.S. dollars adjusted for purchasing power parity, the GDP per
capita of France in 1930 was 1,337 and that of Spain 798 (Tortella, 1994, p.2). Similar
results are found in Maddison (2003, pp. 62 & 68): measured in 1990 international Geary-
Khamis dollars, France’s per capita GDP was 4,532 and Spain’s 2,620.
21 In Catalonia, out of 53 seats, Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya obtained 31 seats,
the Lliga Regionalista 3, the Unió Socialista de Catalunya 2, the Partit Català Republicà 1,
and the Esquerra Catalana Radical-Socialista 2. In Galicia, out of 47 seats, the Federación
Republicana Gallega obtained 14, the Galleguistas 2, and the Regionalistas 1. In the
Basque Country (excluding Navarre), out of 24 seats, the Partido Nacionalista Vasco
obtained 8 seats.
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at the French level as a whole. Indeed, Price (2004) argues that while
the landowners retained an important amount of power at least until 1870,
“‘New’ wealth was represented by a grande bourgeoisie, which had, since
1830, achieved dominance not only in commerce, industry, and the profes-
sions but also in government” (Price, 2004, p. 37). Then, as the bourgeoisie
is dominant both at the regional and at the country level, from Proposition 2
we expect the bourgeoisie to choose unified schooling, which in turns results
in the creation of a common French identity.
The implementation of schooling throughout the country and the cre-
ation of a strong common French identity were actually observed. According
to Nuhog˘lu Soysal and Strang (1989), while France introduced compulsory
education only in 1882, the primary enrollment ratio was already 75 percent
in 1870 (p. 278), the highest amongst developed countries. However, there
were big cross-regional diﬀerences in school attendance (Weber, 1976). In
the 1880s, schooling became free, French was made the only language of
instruction (Chervel, 1992) and “village teachers, trained to greater com-
petence and new self-respect, became the licensed representatives of the
Republic” (Weber, 1976, p. 318). Parallel to this, parents started to per-
ceive that numeracy and literacy were actually useful (as e.g. they were
required to get jobs both in the public and the private sector), attendance
increased, and diﬀerences in attendance across regions started to decline
(Weber, 1976). At the same time, as argued by Weber (1976, p. 332),
“the greater function of the modern school (is) to teach not so much useful
skills as a new patriotism beyond the limits naturally acknowledged by tis
charges. The revolutionaries of 1789 had replaced old terms like schoolmas-
ter, regent, and rector, with instituteur, because the teacher was intended to
institute the nation”. The successful implementation of the schooling system
throughout the country constituted a “wide-ranging process of standardiza-
tion that helped create and reinforce French unity, while contributing to the
disintegration of rival allegiances” (Weber, p. 338).22
In the case of Spain, two regions can be identified as the industrializing
periphery (Catalonia and the Basque Country) and the agricultural “centre”
comprises the rest of the country. According to historians, the bourgeoisie
22Weber (1976, p. 336) also argues that “Teachers taught or were expected to teach ‘not
just for the love of art or science...but for the love of France — a France whose creed had to
be inculcated in all unbelievers. A Catholic God, particularist and only identified with the
fatherland by revisionists after the turn of the centurym was replaced by a secular God:
the fatherland and its living symbols, the army and the flag. Catechism was replaced by
civics lessons. Biblical history, proscribed in secular schools, was replaced by the sainted
history of France”.
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was dominant in the periphery, while the landowning elite from the centre
dominated Spanish politics (see e.g. Linz, 1974; Solé Tura, 1989; or Har-
rison, 1990).23 In our model, the case where the landowners are dominant
at the country level and the bourgeoisie is dominant at the regional level is
studied in Proposition 4. In this Proposition, secession arises as an equilib-
rium outcome when the industrialization shock is weak and is more likely
to arise when the overall size of the bourgeoisie is small.24 While we cannot
directly observe the size of the industrialization shock, Keating (1993) and
Balfour (1995) argue that the Catalan textile industry was uncompetitive
by European standards, and required for this reason a protected market its
goods (Spain) and a protected source of raw materials (cotton from Cuba).
Assuming that the overall size of the bourgeoisie is small at the Spanish
level seems reasonable, given the very limited development of industries in
the rest of the country, as underlined by the literature on the failure of the
industrial revolution in Spain during the 19th century (see Nadal, 1973).
As predicted by the model, the development of the education system was
weak in Spain and peripheral nationalisms developed, although secession
was not observed. Indeed, while education became compulsory already in
1838, primary enrollment ratio in 1870 was only of 42 percent (Nuhog˘lu
Soysal and Strang, 1989, p. 278) and “[c]entral government funding for
primary education remained minimal: between 1850 and 1875 education
never accounted for more than 1.13 of percent of the budget and by the
1870s it had fallen to 0.55 percent” (Shubert, 1990, p. 182). The illiteracy
rate was 71 percent in 1870 and still 50 percent in 1910, against respectively
32 and 13 percent in France in the same dates (Tortella, 2000, p. 13). In
addition, Shubert (1990, p. 183) argues that “the war against non-oﬃcial
languages in Spain was much less successful in Spain than in France (...)
One reason for this was that the Spanish state was much less eﬀective in
creating the basic the basic agent of linguistic uniformity, the schools”.
As for the development of Catalan nationalism, Linz (1974) argues that
a regionalist movement started in Catalonia in the mid 19th century and
turned into a nationalist movement at the end of the century. In addition to
the cultural and literary revival of the Catalan language, “it was the defense
of the interests of the national bourgeoisie that activated manufacturers to
create interest groups, organize meetings, write petitions, and contribute
decisively to the founding of the Lliga de Catalunya in 1887” (p. 62) one
23Harrison (1976, p. 902) argues for instance that “the agrarian and financial interests
of central and southern Spain [who] made up the political oligarchy”.
24Observe that succession is possible in more cases when 2   = (1− ) (2−1+)
which is easier to satify the smaller .
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of the first Catalanist parties. However, the “minority character of the in-
dustrial bourgeoisie of Catalonia, and later the Basque country, in the total
Spanish social structure, and the impossibility for it to gain power at the
center within the oligarchic liberal democracy of the Restoration [1870-1931],
turned it away from the struggle for power in the Spanish state. Instead it
aimed to secure power at the local and regional level and to build up support
on the basis of cultural nationalism to bargain more eﬀectively with the cen-
tral government on economic issues particularly protectionism” (Linz, 1975,
pp. 384-386). Two examples of conflicts between the Catalan bourgeoisie
and the centre’s landowning elite are the fight over tariﬀs after Cuba’s inde-
pendence in 1898 -with the Catalan bourgeoisie defending the elimination of
tariﬀs on foreign grain and the imposition of tariﬀs on foreign textiles (see
Harrison, 1990, or Díez Medrano, 1994)- and over the taxation of industrial
profits during World War I (see e.g. Carr, 1980 or Enrlich, 1998). However,
the programme of the Catalan employers’ group Fomento del Trabajo Na-
cional set up following Cuba’s independence stressed the implementation of
technical education as one four main demands (Harrison, 1974).
A Calculation of cutoﬀs and educational costs for
the elite
Let  refer to the dominant elite group and − to the dominated elite group.
Then educational costs are split as follows:
• For very high productivity shocks,   max
h
 d−i,  = 0, school-
ing is entirely financed by the dominated group: under universal edu-
cation each group member of the dominated group with size − will
have to pay − since the masses of both regions get educated. Under
regional education if only one region gets educated this cost reduces
to 2(−) .
• If max
h
 d−i =d−,
— then for max
hf  −i    d−, the dominant group has to
cofinance education paying e while the dominated group pays
− The value of e for the diﬀerent political regimes is f =
−−(−) and
f = 2 −−(−) if only region  gets educated
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where  is the size of the dominant elite group and − is the
size of the dominated elite group.
— if max
hf  −i = − and max h−ci = −, then for c 
  −, the dominant group wants education, but the domi-
nated group is made worse oﬀ with education, so the dominant
group fully pays the educational costs, namely  under universal
education and 2 under regional education if only one region gets
educated.
• In all other cases the dominant elite group has no interest in imple-
menting schooling.
Table 1 reports the values of the productivity thresholds and associated
payments under unified schooling, region- education and region- seces-
sion.25 In order to calculate the thresholds under secession we take into
account that under secession educational costs are only paid by the elites in
the region where secession is implemented.
Unified education Region- education Region- secession
 1
 1−2 1c 2(1−) + 1c 2−(1−)(2−1+)2(1−) + 1 1−(1−)(−1)(1−) + 1f 2−(1−)(2−1+)(1−)(+2) + 1 2−(1−)2(−1)(1−)(+2) + 1
 (−1)(1−)2 (−1)(1−)4 (1−)(−1)2
 (1−)[2−1+]2 (−1)(1−)2 (1−)(−1)2f 2−(1−)(2−1+)2  1−(−1)(1−) 2 1−(1−)(−1) f 2−(1−)(−1)2  2−(−1)(1−) 4 2−(1−)(−1)4  .
Table 1
25For the time being we ignore nonnegativity constraints on  when calculating and
 . This approach has the advantage that  =  =  for all political regimes , but,
as we will see below it might lead to unnatural rankings of the cutoﬀs, in particular to
   =    (Lemma 1 part 1). This is of no importance, since  is irrelevant
in these cases.
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B School attendance by the masses
Proof of Lemma 2 The relevant cutoﬀs for the elite are f when  
2 and  for the landowners and c for the bourgeoisie when   2.
Equalizing (2) and (3), the cutoﬀ for the masses under unified schooling is
given by  = 1 − 2(−+−)(+2) and from (2) and (6), the threshold for
region- schooling is  = 1 − 2(−1)(+2) . We now show that in all cases
these cutoﬀs are bigger than the cutoﬀ of the masses to be willing to get
schooled. In particular: (i) 1  f always holds given that 1  f ⇔
(1 + ) (1 −2) (1 − )  2 which is always true. (ii) 1  c always
holds given that 1  c ⇔ 0  2(1−) + 2 h 21− − 1 + 2(1 + )2i +
(1− ) which always holds. (iii) 1   holds (trivial). (iv)   
(trivial); (v)   g holds (trivial); (vi)   d always holds as
 d ⇔ 0  (1−) + (2−)1− + + 1− , which always holds.
C Unified versus regional schooling
Proof of Lemma 3 We next turn to dominant landowners. A dominant
bourgeoisie prefers 1 to 2 whenever Π1  Π2 , i.e.,
2 − 1  (1− ) ((1− )) (1 −2)) 2
For   d1 = d2 , we have 2 = 1 = 0 and 1 is preferred if   1
which always holds. The same condition holds for co-payment under both
systems sinceg1 =g2  If 2  2 these are the only relevant comparisons.
For 2  2 the bourgeoisie fully finances education in each region whend2    2 but the cost is the same in each region and 1 is preferred
as   1 (always). For g1    g2 again 1 is preferred sinceg1 d2 = 2 .
Now we look at landowners being dominant . A dominant landowner
prefers 1 to 2 whenever 2  1 . Since 1  2 the following
schooling costs are possible when schooling is implementable in both regions:
• for   d2 schooling is free under both systems sinced1  d2 , and
thus landowners are indiﬀerent.
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• 1 = 0 andg2 for d1    d2 hence 1 is preferred
• g1 and g2 for g2    d1 and g1  g2 so 1 is always
preferred.
Proof of Lemma 4 Dominant landowners prefer unified schooling when-
ever Π  Π , i.e.,
(1− ) ( − 1)
4
  −  (28)
The LHS is always positive since the minimum productivity shock for
which the landowners are willing to implement unified schooling if they do
not have to pay for it is  = 1 . So for free education under unified schooling
(i.e.   c) unified schooling is preferred as (1 − ) ( − 1) 4  −
always holds. Since c  d always holds, and it only remains to check
whether (28) is also true under co-payment under both systems, i.e. for f
and f which can only occur if   2.26 Then (28) becomes
   = 2 + (1− ) ( + 2 (1− )− 2)
(1− ) ( + 4− 2)
Since f  g is always satisfied, co-payment in both systems is only
possible for   g . As it is easy to show that g   ,    always
holds in this case and thus Π  Π holds also in the case of co-payment.
A dominant bourgeoisie prefers unified schooling whenever Π  Π ,
i.e.,
(1− ) ( −− +  (2 −)) 
2  
 −  (29)
The LHS is positive for   −−(2−) which is clearly smaller than
 = 1 . Hence when education is free for the bourgeoisie under both
systems, namely for   c =d , unified schooling is preferred. It remains
to check what happens under co-payment by the bourgeoisie. In this case,
unified schooling is preferred for Π(f )  Π (f ) or equivalently for
   = 2 + (1− ) ( − 2 ( −−))
(1− ) ( + 2 (2 −))
26Observe that 2  1   . This give rise to three cases: (i)   2, (ii)
1  2   and (iii) 2  2  1 .
38
with   f since 2+(1−)(−2(−−))(1−)(+2(2−))  2+(1−)(1−)(1−)(+2) given that the
LHS has a smaller numerator and a bigger denominator than the RHS. Asf g  unified schooling with copayment is always preferred to regional
education with copayment by a dominant bourgeoisie. Now if   2 the
bourgeoisie fully finances education in both systems when d    f.
Then condition (29) becomes
  1− (1− ) ( −−)
(1− ) (2 −)
which is smaller thand since −(1−) ( −  −− + 2)  2−
(notice that the LHS is negative). Hence unified education is preferred. Now
if   2 then for f    g the bourgeoisie fully finances regional
education but only cofinances it under the unified education, which is clearly
better than fully financing it, so unified education is preferred.
D Secession versus unified education
In order to study the incentives of the elite to choose between secession and
unified education we first need to rank the productivity cutoﬀs under the
two systems. This is done in Lemma 5 noting that    .
Lemma 5 1. For 2   then we have either
• f=fg=gmin hd = c  cid or
• f=f  cg=gmin[d = c d ]
2. For   2   the ranking of the thresholds is c  f = f 
 g =g  min[d = c d ]
3. For 2   all thresholds but d = c are smaller than  .
Proof. The three parameter areas follow from Lemma 1 using    .
The ordering of the thresholds is based on the following comparisons which
mainly use simple algebra (i). c =d ; (ii). f=fg=g always by
simple algebra; (iii). c  d always holds given that c  d ⇔ −(1−
) (1 + )  2−; (iv) d d ⇐⇒ (1− )(− 1)   − 2;
39
(v). d  c ⇐⇒ (1− ) (2− 1 + )  2 − 4; (vi) c  f ⇔
2( − 2−)  (1 − ) ((2− 1 + ) (2 +)− 4 (− 1)); (vii)d g always; (viii) If d  c then c  f (by point vii)
D.1 The same group is dominant at the regional and the
state level
Proof of Proposition 2 Lemma 5 guides us which cases we have to
consider:
(i) For   d = c , a dominant bourgeoisie gets schooling for free
under both systems. Imposing  =  = 0 in (22), secession is chosen if
0  (1− )(1 + )2 , which never holds.
(ii) Next, whenever max(g )    d = d , there is copayment
under both systems. In that case,
f − f = (2−(1− )( − 1))µ −−4
¶
 .
Then, as (2−(1− )( − 1))  0 for   d = c we have thatf − f  0 for  = 2 since 1  2 and hence unified schooling is always
preferred to region-2 secession as the payoﬀ (resp. the cost) of schooling is
higher (resp. lower) under unified schooling. We will now show that con-
dition (22) is also violated with co-payment for region-1 secession. Assume
for contradiction that condition (22) holds. This would require:
(2−(1− )( − 1)) (1 −2)
41   (1 + )(1− )

2
which can be rewritten as
   = 2 (1 −2) + (1− ) ( (1 −2)− 21)
(1− ) (21 + (1 −2)) .
However, as g1   by simple algebra this is incompatible with the bour-
geoisie being willing to pay for the additional cost of education.
(iii) For b      (which can only hold for   2), landowners
are not willing to contribute to the cost of education, but it is still profitable
for the bourgeois under both systems to implement education bearing its
full cost. Then, in that case, f =  and f = 2 and condition (22)
becomes
 −−  (1 + )(1− ),
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which can never hold for  = 2. For  = 1 the condition is equivalent to
  1−2−(1−)1(1−)1
   = 1 −2 − (1− )1
(1− )1
and simple calculus reveals that   d11 which is the cutoﬀ that the
bourgeoisie is willing to fully pay education under region-1 secession. Hence
condition (22) is violated.
(iv) Finally, for lower values of  (specifically, f    f for  
  2, c    f for   2   , and c    d for    2) education is implemented only under the unified system,
and thus this system is always preferred.
Proof of Proposition 3 We need to show that  ≤  . By lemma 5
dominant landowners either get education for free under both systems for
  d or have to copay under secession but get education for free under
the unified system 0 =  ≤ f or have to co-pay under both systems. It
remains to prove that f  f which can be rewritten as 2−+ − −  It is immediate to see that this holds for region-1 secession. For
region-2 secession, the required cutoﬀ is    = 1−2−21 but    ,
hence this is always true.
D.2 The identity of the dominant group diﬀers at the re-
gional and state level
D.2.1 The landowners are dominant at the state level, the bour-
geoisie is dominant at the regional level
We exact statement of Proposition 4 is:
The preferences of the bourgeoisie are as follows
1. For 2   the bourgeoisie always prefers to be dominated under
unified schooling to be dominant under secession. However, ford  unified schooling is not implemented with dominant landowners
and the bourgeoisie prefers secession with schooling.
2. For   2   the bourgeoisie always prefers to be dominated
under unified schooling to be dominant under secession if   2 . If
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  2 andmax[d ] =d then the bourgeoisie prefers secession
for     
3. Let 2   
(a) If the bourgeoisie of region 2 is dominant, then secession will
never occur for 2  2 . If, 2  2 secession might occur for
intermediate values of . In particular, if for 2  2
i. g2  c and min[ ] =  secession is never preferred
ii. g2  c and min[ ] =  secession is preferred for     
iii. g2  c secession is preferred for g2    .
(b) If the bourgeoisie of region 1 is dominant, then secession might
occur for intermediate values of  More precisely
i. if 1  2 then secession is never preferred if g  c but
ifg  c secession is preferred forg    min[ ]
ii. if 1  2 and g1  c and min[ ] =  secession is
never preferred
iii. if 1  2 and g1  c and min[ ] =  secession is
preferred for     
iv. if 1  2 and if g1  c secession is preferred for g1   .
where
 = 2− (1− )
(1− )
is such that Π
¡ =  ¢ = Π( = 0) while
 = 2 ( −−)− (1− ) ( + 2)
(1− ) (2 −)
is such that Π
¡ =  ¢ = Π( = f)
Proof of Proposition 4 The bourgeoisie prefers region- secession to
unified schooling whenever condition (22) holds, namely
 −   (1 + )(1− )

2
. (30)
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The exact value of  and  depends on the identity of the dominant
group, the size of the shock, and the underlying parameters.
The following payment constellation may occur.
1.   max
³d  c´: from Fig. 3 and 4, if education is implemented
under  , the dominated bourgeoisie pays.  =  and from Fig. 1
and 2, education for the dominant bourgeoisie is free under secession
( = 0). From (22) , secession is preferred if and only if:
  =2− (1− )
(1− ) (31)
2. min[d  c]    max[d c]: we have to distinguish two sub-
cases:
(a) If min[d c] = d , then  =  and  = 0 In this case
secession is always preferred because the condition (22) reduces to
   = 1 which is always satisfied as this is the condition for
the bourgeoisie to be willing to implement free education under
secession.
(b) If min[d  c] = c, then  =  and  = f  The condition
that secession is preferred becomes
 1= =2 (−−)−(1− ) ( + 2)(1− ) (2−) for 2 
(32)
 2= =(1− ) ( + 2)− 2 ( −−)(1− ) ( − 2) for 2 
(33)
3. For g    max [d c],  =  and  = f . Secession is
always preferred in this area since the condition (22) reduces to  g which is the condition for the bourgeoisie to be willing to go for
co-payment under secession.
We need to check under which conditions the cutoﬀs (31), (32) and
(33) are relevant cutoﬀs. Both  and 1 are upper bounds. Therefore
 is not relevant if   max[d  c]. Similarly, 1 is not relevant
for 1  max[g  c]. Since 2 is a lower bound it is not relevant
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for 2  d . Lemma 6 tells us under which conditions these cutoﬀs are
relevant and how the relate to each other and to the diﬀerent payment areas.
Lemma 6 1.   c always
2.  d ⇔ 2 d ⇔   2
3. 1 d ⇔ 1   ⇔  d
4. g  c ⇔ 1 g ⇔ 1  c
5. For 22   ,   d2 and 1   and 1  g2 always
6. 2 g ⇔g  c ⇔ 2  c
7. min[d  c] =d ⇒   max[d  c]
Proof.
1. c = 2−(1−)(2−1+)2(1−) + 1   = 2−(1−)(+)(1−) + 1 can be rewritten
as (1− ) ( + 1)  2 which is always true
2. Simple algebra reveals that  d ⇔ 2 d ⇔
(1− ) (+ )  2( − ) (34)
3. Simple algebra reveals that 1  d ⇔ 1   ⇔   d ⇔
condition (34) holds.
4. Simple algebra reveals thatg  c ⇔ 1 g ⇔ 1  c ⇔
(1− ) ( (2− (1− )) + 2 (1 + ))  2 − 4− (35)
5. From the proof of Proposition 4, 1 is the relevant threshold for
region-2 secession for 22   . It is easy to see that (34) always
holds in this case. Hence by point 3 in this Lemma it follows that
  d2 always holds for this parameter space. Next 1   =
1
 ⇔ ( −−)  (1 − ) (+ ) which is always true for  − and hence it is always true for secession in region 2. Similarly,
22   ⇔ 2 −42  0 and thus also 2 −41  0 given that
1  2. Then, the RHS of (35) is negative for region-2 secession,
which from (35) implies that 1 g holds for region-2 secession.
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6. Simple algebra reveals that 2 g ⇔g  c ⇔ 2  c ⇔
(1− ) ( (2− (1− )) + 2 (1 + ))  2 − 4− (36)
7. If min[d  c] = d then   max[d c] since by point 1  c.
We are now set to prove proposition 4. In general, the results follow by
combining the parameter restriction and the resulting ranking of the cutoﬀs
with the insights derived from Lemma 6. Here are the details.
1. We look at the parameter area where 2   . Given f  g
it follows immediately that unified schooling is preferred for low ,
namely f = f   g =g .
(a) Let   2 . For  = 2 by point 5 of Lemma 6 neither 1nor are relevant cutoﬀs and therefore secession is never preferred.
In turn, for  = 1 we have to distinguish two further cases: (i) ifg  c by point 4 of Lemma 6 1 g and therefore 1 is
not a relevant cutoﬀ. Moreover, sinceg d always by point
3 of Lemma 6  is not a relevant cutoﬀ either and secession is
never preferred; (ii) If g  c by point 4 of Lemma 6 1
might be a relevant cutoﬀ. By point 3 of Lemma 6 the relevant
cutoﬀ is min[1  ]. Notice that  is always relevant by point
7 of Lemma 6 if min[d c] =d 
(b) Let   2  Again we need to distinguish two cases: (i) Ifg  c by point 6 of Lemma 6 2  c . By point 2 of
Lemma 6 if min[2  ] =  secession is never preferred, but if
min[2  ] = 2 then both cutoﬀs are relevant and secession
is preferred for 2     In turn, (ii) if g  c by point
6 of Lemma 6 2 g and hence the lower bound for seces-
sion becomes g  Also 2  c and by point 2 of Lemma 6
2 d , so  is the relevant upper bound for secession.
2. We now look at the parameter area where   2   . In this
parameter constellation under the unified system the bourgeoisie al-
ways fully finances education. Since c  g by point 4 of lemma
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6 the cutoﬀ 1 is never relevant given that 1 g . From point
4, we also know that 1  c holds. For 2   , d  d .
As d  c, then d  c. Combining this with c  1 , we
get that d  1 and thus from point 3, d  , and hence is not a relevant cutoﬀ and the unified system is always preferred.
Consider instead now the case with 2   . As c  g = f ,
from point 6 of lemma 6, we know that 2  c and 2  g .
Thus secession with the bourgeoisie pays part of the cost of education
is possible if and only if 2  d . Note that  is defined as the
point of intersection of
Π( =  ) = −

 (1− (1− )) +(1− ) (37)
Π
¡ = 0¢ = (1− )2 + (1− )2  (38)
It is easy to check that the intercept of (38) is higher and its slope
with respect to  half of the slope of (37). In turn, 1 and 2 give
the point of intersection of Π( =  ) with
Π
³
=f´= − 4 (2− (1− ) (2 −))+(1− ) (2+) 4 
(39)
for respectively 2   and 2   . In addition, the slope
of (39) is smaller than the slope of (37) if and only if 2   .
The intercept of (39) is always smaller than the intercept of (37) for
secession of region 2. This is also true as long as 2 is positive for
secession in region 1.27 Therefore we have 2   for 22   .
Then, from point 2, we also have that 2  d and d  ,
which implies that region-2 secession is chosen by the bourgeoisie for
22   if 2    .
3. Finally we study the parameter area   2. In this case we always
have c    d hence the bourgeoisie always fully finances
education under unified schooling. We also haveg   , so that the
bourgeoisie is always willing to go for co-payment for     d
and will get education for free for  d .
27But the opposite holds if 2 is negative.
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In this parameter area,g  c always holds. Then by point 4 (rep.
point 3) of lemma 6 1  g (resp.   d) which implies that1 (resp. ) is never a relevant cutoﬀ and that unified schooling
is always preferred. Now, by point 6 of lemma 6 2  c. Can
it be the case that secession is preferred for 2    ? From
(33), the cutoﬀ 2 might only be relevant if 2   . Note that
this can be rewritten as 2 +   1. The parameter area we are
studying requires  = 2(1− )(− 1)  2Combining both con-
ditions requires 2 +   (1 − )( − 1) which is equivalent to
(2− (1− )(− 1)) +   0 which is clearly false. Hence 2
cannot be a relevant cutoﬀ when   2. So unified schooling is
always preferred when it is implementable.
However, education under secession of region  is implemented by the
bourgeoisie before unified schooling is implemented by the dominant
landowners, namely for d     . For these parameter values,
the dominant bourgeoisie in region  prefers secession of region  to be
dominated by landowners with no schooling.
D.2.2 Regionally dominant but nationally dominated landowners
Proof of Proposition 5 If landowners are dominant in region  but dom-
inated at the state level, they prefer secession whenever    . The
following educational costs are possible
• For 2   there are two possible rankings of the cutoﬀs:
1. fgcd (Lemma 5)For  d education is free un-
der secession but has to be paid fully under unified schooling,
so secession is preferred. For c  d , under unified school-
ing ,  landowners pay full education costs for  mass mem-
bers, while under secession there is co-payment and thus 2
landowners pay less than the full cost for 2 mass members
implying that    and thus secession is preferred. Next, forg  c landowners pay their maximum willingness under
unified schooling  = (−1)(1−)2 and copay under secessionf = 1−(1−)(−1)  and it can be shown    ⇔  g , so secession is also preferred by the landowners whenever
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  g , i.e., whenever it is implementable. For e  g ,
education is only implemented under unified schooling, and thus
the landowners prefer unified schooling in that case.
2. fgdc (Lemma 5)For  d education is free un-
der secession but the landowners either pay their maximal willing-
ness or the entire education under unified schooling, so secession
is preferred. For g  c , landowners pay their maximum
willingness under the unified schooling  = (−1)(1−)2 and
copay under secession f = 1−(1−)(−1)  and   
whenever   g . Finally, for e  g , education is only
implemented under unified schooling, and thus the landowners
prefer unified schooling in that case.
• For  2   the cutoﬀs rank as follows f g min[c d ]
(Lemma 5)If min[c d ] = c , then we have the same cases as for
2   and secession is always preferred (for  g ) when it is im-
plementable. If min[c d ] =d then for  d education is free
under secession and the landowners have to pay their maximal will-
ingness (and later even the entire education) under unified schooling,
so secession is preferred. Forg   d there is copayment under
secession while the landowners have to pay their maximal willingness
under unified schooling, and we have shown that secession is preferred
for   g . Hence also here secession is always preferred when it is
implementable
• For   2 landowners get education under secession for free, so it
is always preferred when it is implementable.
E Welfare analysis
E.1 Proof of Proposition 6
Regional schooling is preferred to unified schooling by social planner if and
only if 1 + 2 + 2 + 
¡
1 +  ¡1 + 2 ¢¢  2 ¡(1 + )2 + (1 + )¢,
which is equivalent to    = 1+(

2
+2)−
(2 +(2+))
. However, it is easy to
show that   11 which means that region-1 schooling is preferred
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to unified schooling only when the social planner prefers no education to
region-1 schooling, and thus regional schooling is never preferred over unified
schooling. The same applies to region-2 schooling as 11  22 . Finally,
regional schooling with schooling in both regions is dominated by unified
schooling given that the cost of both systems is the same and only unified
schooling generates cross-regional matches.
E.2 Proof of Proposition 7
We first show that when   2, there is too little nation building from a
social point of view for  ≤  ≤ f . For   2, the threshold for unified
schooling is always f no matter the identity of the dominant group, and it
is easy to show that   f always holds.
Next we consider the case where   2. When the landowners are
dominant, the relevant cutoﬀ for education is  . . We need to show that
here is too little nation building from a social point of view for  ≤  ≤  .
It can be shown that   1 =  ⇔ 2   (2+  − 1) and thus for ≡ (1− ) (2+  − 1)  2,    holds. If the bourgeoisie
is dominant, the relevant cutoﬀ is c It is easy to show that   c
⇔   2 + 4 . Thus, for   2 + 4 ,   d and there is
undereducation for     c, and instead for   2 + 4 ,  d holds and there is overeducation for c     .
E.3 Eﬃciency of Region-1 Secession
Figure A1 studies the optimality of schooling under region-1 secession when
the bourgeoisie is dominant and  = 01,  = 095, 1 = 045,  = 05, and
 = 2 The dashed line represents the threshold for the implementation of
education under region-1 secession for a dominant bourgeoisie (given by b1
as for these parameter values 1  2), while the solid line represents the
socially-eﬃcient productivity threshold (11 ).
49
As for unified schooling, the eﬃcient no-education (resp. education)
decision is taken in region I (resp. region IV), while there is undereducation
in region II and overeducation in region III.
E.4 Proof of Proposition 8
From Proposition 4, unified schooling cannot be implemented but secession
can for   2 and b     . As   2 ⇔ b   ⇔ (1 −
)(−1)  1, then we know that    ⇔ (−1)  1 necessarily
holds here. As secession is preferred to no education whenever    ,
secession is optimal and implementable for max[ d ]     .
E.5 Numerical examples of overprovision and underprovi-
sion of secession by a regional dominant but nationwide
dominated bourgeoisie
Example 1 For  = 01,  = 03 1 = 05,  = 09 and  = 35 we have
 = 0964912  d = 1 02293   = 11111. Implemented secession
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is socially optimal for d     but there is too little secession for
   d
Example 2 For  = 005,  = 045 1 = 05,  = 095 and  = 5 we haved = 065374   = 0666345   = 105263. Implemented secession
is socially optimal for      but there is too much secession ford    
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